The subobject classifier and its logical applications
Essay (1(a)). In a given category C, let us declare that a monic f : a d is contained in a monic g : b d, if there is a map h : a b such that gh = f . We declare two monics f, g into d two be equivalent, written f ≃ g, if each is contained in the other. A subobject of d is an equivalence class of monics into d, and the relation of containment gives us a poset (Sub(d), ⊆) on the subobjects of d.
Let C be a category with a terminal object 1. A subobject classifier of C is a C-object Ω together with a C-arrow 1 true −−→ Ω that satisfies the following axiom:
(Ω-axiom): For each monic f : a d there is a unique C-arrow χ f : d → Ω making a d
1 Ω a pullback square.
We say χ f is the character of the subobject f , and often write ⊤ for true and true a for a ! − → 1 true − −− → Ω.
When they exist, subobject classifiers are unique up to (unique) isomorphism, and it is also easy to see that the assignment of χ f to f yields a 1-1 correspondence between subobjects of d and arrow d → Ω -we have Sub(d) ∼ = C(d, Ω) (at least, so long as we can take arbitrary pullbacks).
An (elementary) topos E is a Cartesian closed category with a subobject classifier. For instance, Set is a topos with subobject classifier ⊤ : 1 1 − → 2. In Set, a monic is just a subset a ⊆ d, and we are familiar with the characteristic function χ a : d → {0, 1} that sends an element of d to 1 if it belongs to a, and 0 otherwise. We have P(d) = Sub(d) ∼ = Set(d, 2), and furthermore there are operations of (set-theoretic) union ∪, intersection ∩ and complement ¬ on Sub(d). These operations turn Sub(d) into a Boolean algebra: a complemented distributive lattice. In particular, we can use Set(1, Ω) = {0, 1} and its operations of ∪, ∩ and ¬ to model classical logic.
That is the story in Set; subobject classifiers are important because they generalise this concept -once we define on E(1, Ω) categorical notions of union, intersection and negation that generalise their counterparts in the case of Set, we can model different flavours of logics on different topoi! Some of these logics will not even be classical -that is, they will differ from the logic of Set, and Sub(d) need not be a Boolean algebra. The algebra of subobjects in such a topos will only be a Heyting algebra. Let us see how the whole idea of 'modelling logic with topoi' works, starting with classical logic.
Recall that in defining the formal language PL (propositional logic), we have the set Φ 0 := {π 0 , π 1 , π 2 , . . .} of variables, and the set Φ := {α : α is a PL-sentence} of sentences. (See the Appendix for a review of the formal language PL, along with the axiom systems CL (classical logic) and IL (intuitionistic logic).)
Recall also that every Boolean algebra B = (B, ⊑, ⊓, ⊔, ′ , 0, 1) has, by definition, operations of meet (⊓), join (⊔), and complement ( ′ ). We may additionally define an implication operation as x ⇒ y := x ′ ⊔ y. We now describe the semantics of PL in B: A B-valuation is a function V : Φ 0 → B. By the following rules, any valuation lifts uniquely to a function V : Φ → B:
We say a sentence α is B-valid, and write B |= α, if for every B-valuation V we have V (α) = 1.
Note that in any B, 0 and 1 provide a copy of the Boolean algebra 2, so already we see that B |= α only if α is a tautology, i.e., 2 |= α.
We have the following Soundness Theorem for B-validity:
The converse also holds! That is, we have the following Completeness Theorem: If B |= α then ⊢ CL α.
In particular, if a sentence is valid in some Boolean algebra, then it is a CL-theorem, so it is valid in every Boolean algebra! This is a powerful result, and indeed, completeness is the harder direction of the two to prove.
Next, let us fulfill the promise of defining truth-arrows in a topos -categorical notions of ∩, ∪ etc. on the subobject classifier. Let E be a topos with classifier ⊤ : 1 → Ω. Make the following definitions:
1. ¬ : Ω → Ω is the character of ⊥ : 1 → Ω, where ⊥ is the character of ! : 0 → 1.
∩
: Ω × Ω → Ω is the character of the product arrow ⊤, ⊤ : 1 → Ω × Ω.
(The image of a map f : a → b in a topos is the smallest subobject of b through which f factors.) 4. ⇒: Ω × Ω → Ω is the character of e : ≤ Ω × Ω, where e is the equaliser of
In Set, unpacking the definitions gives us the classical truth functions. For instance, ⇒: 2 × 2 → 2 sends (1, 0) to 0 and all other tuples to 1.
Now we can describe the semantics of interpreting propositional logic in any topos E! A truth value in E is an arrow 1 → Ω. An E-valuation is a function V : Φ 0 → E(1, Ω). Similarly to valuations on a Boolean algebra, any such function extends to all of Φ by the following rules:
We say α is E-valid, and write E |= α, if for every E-valuation V we have V (α) = ⊤ : 1 → Ω. Several questions immediately arise. For one, we might wonder if the notions of B-valuations and E-valuations are related. We shall give a better result at the end of this section, once we generalise the notion of a Boolean algebra B to that of Heyting algebra H, and define H-valuations entirely analogously to B-valuations. It will then be noted that Sub(d) is always a Heyting algebra, and that an E-valuation is precisely a Sub(1)-valuation, where 1 ∈ E is the terminal object.
Another question one might ask is how 'compatible' our topos interpretation is with the system CL: namely, we ask if CL is sound and complete for E-validity. (This was the case for B-validity, i.e., when we interpreted propositional logic in a Boolean algebra.) It turns out that CL is complete but not sound for E-validity: in any topos E, every E-valid sentence is derivable as a theorem in CL, but there exist topoi E in which some CL-theorems are not E-valid. More precisely, the first eleven axioms of CL (see Appendix) are always E-valid, so we are saying that in some topoi the twelth axiom α∨ ∼ α is not valid. The 'correct' axiom system which captures E-validity is the system IL (intuitionistic logic), obtained simply by removing the twelfth axiom of CL, keeping all other axioms, and the single inference rule. In IL, tautologies such as α∨ ∼ α and ∼∼ α ⊃ α are not derivable, so this is genuinely a different system than CL.
A topos is degenerate if there is an arrow 1 → 0, or equivalently, if all its objects are isomorphic. A topos is bivalent if ⊤ and ⊥ are its only truth values. A topos is classical if [⊤, ⊥] : 1 + 1 → Ω is an isomorphism. These are just various measures of how much a topos 'looks like' Set, which is a non-degenerate bivalent classical topos. We remark that for a bivalent topos E, we do have CL-soundness for E-validity.
As examples, the category Set 2 of pairs of sets is a classical, non-bivalent topos. If M is a monoid, then the category M-Set of its actions is a topos, and this topos is classical iff M is a group. In particular M 2 -Set is not classical, where M 2 is the monoid ({0, 1}, ·) where · is usual integer multiplication. It is, however, bivalent, so by the above paragraph M 2 -Set models all the CL-theorems.
Let us next discuss how to turn Sub(d) into a lattice, which we alluded to earlier. Let E be a topos, and d ∈ E. Using the operations we have defined on we define some operations on Sub(d): 1. E is Boolean;
2. Sub(Ω) is a Boolean algebra;
3. E is classical;
In particular, in a non-Boolean topos ⇛ behaves differently from a Boolean implication operator.
The following equivalent conditions are weaker than the above:
1. E |= α iff ⊢ CL α for every α;
2. E |= α∨ ∼ α for any α;
3. Sub(1) is a Boolean algebra.
These really are weaker conditions. For instance we have remarked that M 2 -Set models every CL-theorem but is not classical.
The slogan is topoi generalise sets, so let us go further and define, where f : a d is a subobject of d in topos E, x : 1 → d to be an element of f if x factors through f . Write this as x ∈ f . We always have, in Sub(d), x ∈ f ∩ g iff x ∈ f and x ∈ g. However, the property
holds in every Sub(d), iff E is bivalent. As for the property x ∈ f ∪ g and x ∈ f or x ∈ g, if this holds in every Sub(d) we say E is disjunctive.
We have the following characterisation:
If E is Boolean and non-degenerate, then it is disjunctive iff it is bivalent.
A topos is extensional if in Sub(d) we always have
That is, extensional topoi are those in which subobjects are determined by their elements. Set is extensional.
Let us say a bit more about non-Boolean topoi in general. A topos fails to be Boolean precisely when some
Finally, a Heyting algebra is an r.p.c. lattice with zero. If H = (H, ⊑, ⇒, 0) is a Heyting algebra, we may define the pseudo-complement ¬ : H → H as ¬a = a ⇒ 0.
We define an H-valuation as a function V : Φ 0 → H. Once again, such a function extends to a function on sentences, using ⊓, ⊔, ⇒, ¬ to respectively interpret ∧, ∨, ⊃, ∼ in exactly the same way as with B-valuations. A sentence α is H-valid if for all H-valuations V , V (α) = 1. α is HA-valid if it is valid in every Heyting algebra.
We have Soundness and Completeness! α is HA-valid iff ⊢ IL α.
The point is, although (Sub(d), ⊆) need not be a Boolean algebra, it is always a Heyting algebra. It can be verified that the r.p.c. is given by ⇛.
Since the Ω-axiom gave us Sub(d) ∼ = E(d, Ω) (as sets), we may also consider the latter as a Heyting algebra. To our relief, the following holds:
This is because the unit of the Heyting algebra E(1, Ω) is ⊤ : 1 → Ω.
Soundness of IL for E-validity now follows immediately for its soundness for HA-validity:
In fact IL-Completeness for E-validity also holds: If α is valid on every topos, then ⊢ IL α. The latter is proven using some additional theory on Kripke-style semantics, in Goldblatt (2006) .
As a final remark, we note that higher-order logics can also be interpreted in topoi -these are logics with quantifiers ∀, ∃. All this again exploits the Heyting algebra structure on Sub(d), which we recall hinges on the existence of the wonderful subobject classifier.
2 The subobject classifier on a presheaf topos
The subobject classifier Ω of the presheaf topos given by Set P op , where P is the powerset of {1, 2, 3} seen as a poset under inclusion, is described as follows.
For a given object a in P , let S a be the collection of all elements in P contained in a,
A crible on a, or a-crible, is a downwards-closed subset S of S a , meaning whenever b ∈ S and c ⊆ b, then c ∈ S. Then the subobject classifier is the functor Ω : P op → Set defined on objects by by
and on maps by
(More generally, the subobject category on a functor category [C, Set] is described similarly using the dual notion of cribles, called sieves. This is explained in Goldblatt (2006) .) In our example, there are twenty generalised truth values (arrows from the terminal object to Ω).
To see this, note that the terminal object in Set P op is the functor that sends every element of P op to the terminal object of Set, which is just a singleton 1. The (co)representable functor H {1,2,3} = P (−, {1, 2, 3}) does this, since for any a ⊆ {1, 2, 3} the set P (a, {1, 2, 3}) has precisely one element, given by a ⊆ {1, 2, 3}.
Next, observe that
by the Yoneda Lemma.
This means that the generalized truth values are just elements of Ω({1, 2, 3}), i.e., {1, 2, 3}-cribles. There are twenty of these:
{∅, {1}, {2}, {3}, {1, 2}{2, 3}, {1, 3}, {1, 2, 3}}.
We have systemically listed these twenty {1, 2, 3}-cribles in ascending order of the size of a largest set contained in the crible: first we listed the empty crible, then we listed the singleton crible, then the cribles whose largest size of an element is one, then those whose largest size of an element is two, then the crible equal to the entire powerset P({1, 2, 3}) of {1, 2, 3}.
Henceforth we will often write Ω to mean Ω({1, 2, 3}) ∼ = Sub(H {1,2,3} ).
Proposition (1(b)(ii)). Regarding the truth values of the subobject classifier as a Heyting algebra, Ω has a monoid stucture with multiplication given by the lattice meet operation ∧.
Proof. The meet operation on Ω is given by set-theoretic intersection. We need to show that this is an associative binary operation on the set of {1, 2, 3}-cribles, and that the powerset P({1, 2, 3}) is the unit of this operation.
To show that ∧ is a binary operation, we must check that if S 1 and S 2 are {1, 2, 3}-cribles, then so is S 1 ∧ S 2 :
• Suppose c ∈ S 1 ∧ S 2 , and b ⊆ c.
This shows that S 1 ∧ S 2 is really downwards-closed, i.e., a crible.
This binary operation is associative because taking set-theoretic intersections is associative: for any sets x, y, z, we have (
Finally, the operation has unit P({1, 2, 3}) because its intersection with any {1, 2, 3}-crible S is just S.
(After all, we have S ⊆ S {1,2,3} = P({1, 2, 3}).)
3 Actions of the subobject classifier
As a monoid, Ω can act on a set X. This action is well-defined if
for all p, q ∈ X, where p = q is the truth value of the assertion p = q.
All of the below concerns well-defined actions as above. We define a partial order on Ω by α ≤ β iff α∧β = α. We may assume that
We also note that the truth assignment satisfies
Goldblatt (2006) provides these as axioms under the section Heyting-valued sets.
Lemma (1(c)(i)). For all p, q the following three statements are equivalent:
Proof. We show that the first statement implies the second, the second implies the third, and the third implies the first.
• The first statement implies the second, by assumption of the action being well-defined:
• The second statement implies the third; just take α = p = q .
• The third statement implies the first.
the lattice meet operation is commutative;
= p = q · (α · q) compatibility axiom for monoid actions;
Write p ≤ q if the above equivalent conditions hold.
Lemma (1(c)(ii)). The relation ≤ just defined is a partial order on X.
Proof. We check reflexivity, transitivity and antisymmetry. Let p, q, r ∈ X.
• p ≤ p.
Use the third equivalent statement above, and the unit axiom for monoid actions. (This says p = 1 · p, where 1 is the unit of the monoid.)
• if p ≤ q and q ≤ r, then p ≤ r.
Use again the third characterisation of p ≤ q. Writing p = α · q and q = β · r, we see that
• if p ≤ q and q ≤ p, then p = q.
Using the first characterisation of p ≤ q, write p = p = q · p.
Using the second characterisation of q ≤ p,
Then we see that p = p = q · p = q.
Proposition (1(c)(iii)). The action of Ω on X seen as a map Ω × X → X is order-preserving in each variable respectively.
Proof. We simply check this in each variable.
Suppose we have α, β ∈ Ω with α ≤ β. We show that
and we are done by the third characterisation of α · p ≤ β · p.
• • Suppose we have p, q ∈ X with p ≤ q. We show that α · p ≤ α · q for each α ∈ Ω. Well, using the third characterisation of p ≤ q, there is some β ∈ Ω such that p = β · q. Then,
where the last step follows from the fact that the action is order-preserving in the first variable, and the fact that α ∧ β ≤ α.
Proposition (1(c)(iv)). The partial order on X has a greatest lower bound operation given by
Proof. This operation is at least well-defined, since we are working with well-defined actions. We need to show that p ∧ q ≤ p and p ∧ q ≤ q, and that p ∧ q is universal with respect to these properties, meaning that whenever r ≤ p and r ≤ q, we have r ≤ p ∧ q.
• p ∧ q ≤ p. p ∧ q = p = q · p, so w are done by the third characterisation of p ∧ q ≤ p. (Just take α = p ∧ q .)
Similarly, p ∧ q = p = q · q, so w are done by the third characterisation of p ∧ q ≤ q. (Just take α = p ∧ q .)
•
the action is order-preserving in the first variable.
Proposition (1(c)(v)).
For all p ∈ X we have an adjunction given by the pair of functors F p : Ω → X and
Proof. Fix p ∈ X. It is enough for us to give the unit η : id Ω → G p F p and counit ǫ : F p G p → id X of the adjunction. Let us first show that α ≤ G p F p (α) for each α ∈ Ω, and F p G p (q) ≤ q for each q ∈ X.
• α ≤ G p F p (α) for each α ∈ Ω. We have
We have
the action is well-defined; ≤p ∧ q by the third characterisation of
This means we have a collection of maps η α : α → G p F p (α) in Ω, and a collection of maps ǫ q : F p G p (q) → q in X. These respectively give us our unit η and counit ǫ of the adjunction. Indeed, since all diagrams commute in a poset, we immediately have naturality of η and of ǫ, and also that they satisfy the triangle identities
Write p ∈ Y = ∪ z∈Y z = p , where ∪ is the lattice join operation on Ω, which is just set-theoretic union.
(The union of downwards-closed sets is again downwards-closed.)
Proof. We want to show that for each y ∈ Y , we have y ≤ p ∈ Y · p, and furthermore, any upper bound q of Y satisfies p ∈ Y · p ≤ q.
• for each y ∈ Y , y ≤ p ∈ Y · p.
Observe that y ≤ y (by reflexivity of ≤) and y ≤ p (as p is an upper bound for Y ), so we have y ≤ y ∧ p. Therefore,
action is order-preserving in the first variable;
= p ∈ Y · p.
• if y ≤ q for each y, then (∪ z∈Y z = p ) · p ≤ q. By the proposition above, we know that p ≤ q · p = F p G p (q) ≤ q, so it will be enough to show that
In fact, we only need to show that
since the action is order-preserving in the first variable.
Let us now show that y = p ≤ p ≤ q for each y ∈ Y . (Then we would be done, by the universal property of the join.) First note that y = y ∧ q = 1, since 1 ≤ 1 · y = y by assumption (1);
1 is the greatest element of the lattice.
Hence, we have
and so,
as desired.
Monad morphisms
Recall that for a monad (T, µ, η) on a category C, the objects of its Eilenberg-Moore category C T are pairs (A, σ A ) consisting of an object A in C and a C-morphism σ A : T A → A such that
As such, the Eilenberg-Moore category of algebras for the monad comes equipped with a forgetful functor U : C T → C.
For two categories C 1 and C 2 , a monad morphism from T 1 to T 2 is a pair (F, θ) consisting of a functor F : C 1 → C 2 and a natural transformation θ :
Proposition (2(a)(i)). A monad morphism (F, θ) as above can be used to uniquely define a functorF between the corresponding categories of algebras such that the following diagram commutes:
Proof. Given such a monad morphism (F, θ), define a functorF :
Indeed, for the desired diagram to commute, the carrier of the algebraF (A, σ A ) has to be
Let us check that our definition really gives us a T 2 -algebra:
We still have to defineF on morphisms in C 1 T1 .
Given a homomorphism of
as the homomorphism of T 2 -algebras F A F h − − → F B. Indeed, for the desired diagram to commute, our choice ofF (h) is defined uniquely:
Let us check that F h is really a homomorphism of T 2 -algebras:
Finally, let us check the two functoriality axioms:
Proposition (2(a)(ii)). The converse also holds: each commutative diagram (2) gives rise to a natural transformation θ making (F, θ) into a monad morphism.
Proof. Suppose we have a functorF :
We construct a natural transformation θ : T 2 F =⇒ F T 1 as follows. ApplyF to the free T 1 -algebra (T 1 A, (µ 1 ) A ) to get a T 2 -algebra
Note that for each homomorphism of T 1 -algebras h, we again know whatF (h) must be. It is given by
Now, let us check naturality of θ:
Next, let us verify that (F, θ) is indeed a monad morphism:
, by the unit monad axiom for T 1 ;
A is a hom of (free) T 1 -algebras, by the associativity monad axiom for T 1 ;
Proof. Let F be faithful, meaning given any two objects A, B of C 1 and a map F A
Suppose we are given two
and two homomorphisms of
However, both f = h 1 and f = h 2 satisfy this equation:
Therefore, we must have h 1 = h 2 (as maps in C 1 , so also as maps in C T1 1 ).
Proposition (2(a)(iv)). If F is fully faithful and each component of θ is an epimorphism, thenF is fully faithful.
Proof. Now we additionally assume F is full, meaning given any two objects A, B of C 1 and a map F A
Suppose we are given two T 1 -algebras (A, σ A ), (B, σ B ) and a homomorphism of T 2 -algebras
By fullness of F , there is some map
Let us show that f is a homomorphism of T 1 -algebras:
Well, we have
Since we also assumed F to be faithful, we have f
By construction,F f = F f = k, so we have completed our proof thatF is full. We already know by the result above thatF is faithful, so we are done.
Theorem (2(a)(v) ). If F is fully faithful and θ is an isomorphism, thenF is the pullback of F along U 2 .
Proof. Since θ is an isomorphism, there is some natural transformation β : F T 1 =⇒ T 2 F such that θ • β = id F T1 and β • θ = id T2F . In particular, for each A we have
hence each component θ A is split epic, hence epic! Therefore we are in the situation of Proposition 2(a)(iv) above, andF is fully faithful.
We wish to show that
F is a pullback square. It certainly commutes, so let us check that it is universal as such. Suppose we have another commutative square:
We construct a unique functor G : D → C T1 1 such that
• Uniqueness of G: Suppose G is a functor satisfying these conditions. Fix D ∈ D. The carrier of the T 1 -algebra GD has to be
We claim that σ G1D is also uniquely determined. ApplyF to this T 1 -algebra, to get the T 2 -algebrâ
,
This shows that σ G1D is unique! (F is fully faithful, so there can only be one map F −1 ( σ G1D • β G1D ) sent by F to σ G1D • β G1D , and we have just shown that σ G1D is such a map.)
We have shown that the action of G on objects is uniquely determined. Next, let us show that its action on maps is also uniquely determined.
This shows that Gf is unique. (F is fully faithful, so there can only be one mapF −1 (G 2 f ) sent byF to G 2 f , and we have just shown that Gf is such a map.)
• Existence of G:
We know by the above what G has to be, if it exists:
It must be given by
, where σ is the map given by
Let us show that this gives us a well-defined functor from D to C T1 1 .
Note that Gf =F −1 (G 2 f ) is a homomorphism of T 1 -algebras, by definition. (It is the one that maps underF to the homomorphism of T 2 -algebras G 2 f . Next, we see that GD is really a T 1 -algebra:
Since F is faithful, it is enough to check equality on F applied to these maps. We have
by naturality of β;
Again it is enough to check equality on F applied to these maps. We have
Next, let us check functoriality of G:
where in the last step we are using thatF is fully faithful, and thatF id GD = idF GD = id G2D .
, where in the last step we are using thatF is fully faithful, and that
Finally, we must check the universal property for pullbacks:
so we have equality on objects. On maps,F
-
so we have equality on objects. On maps,
where the last equality follows from the equality of F applied to these maps:
Modelling non-determinism with monads
Essay (2(b) ). Monad are commonly used to model non-deterministic procedures. This can be implemented effectively in Haskell (or indeed other functional programming languages).
Non-determinism of an algorithm just means that at each stage there are several possible outputs that can be taken as input of the next stage. For instance, non-deterministic finite state automata have transition functions of the form δ : Q × Σ ∪ ǫ → P(Q), where Q is the set of states, and Σ is the alphabet. At each stage the machine may transition to several (or no) states. We give three brief instances of how monads model non-determinism. Since we would like to account for each possible branch of the computation, we use the list monad to form a collection of the outcomes. (The Powerset monad works fine, too -see our closing remark.)
Our first example demonstrates the extent to which monads are inbuilt into Haskell. where app takes a function and an element and applies the former to the latter. The monad does not even appear explicitly, but we are actually using the list monad as an applicative. To make the monad structure more clear, we note that this is nothing more than the list comprehension
In general, a comprehension has the form [t|q], where t is a term, and q a qualifier. A qualifier has one of the following forms:
• the empty qualifier Λ;
• a generator x ← u, for some variable x and list-valued term u;
• a composition (p,q) of shorter qualifiers.
The point is that monads (T, η, µ) can be derived from comprehensions, and vice versa. We have:
See Wadler (1992) for further details.
A second example is the composition of multi-valued functions. If we take the m th root of a complex number, and then take the n th root of the result, we want this to be equal to the result of taking the mn th root. Hence we would like to return mn possibilities in a list. Once again the list monad achieves this. We simply define: Here we have given the monad in Kleisli form, where the Kleisli extension is given by bind, and the unit by unit, of course.
We end with another application of the list monad, to the modelling of a conditional probability problem (Taylor, 2013 ). Suppose we are given two boxes A and B, each containing three marbles. The first has one white and two black marbles; the second has all three marbles white. We blindly select a box at random, and then from the box randomly extract a marble. If this is white, what is the probability that we selected the first box? Using Bayes' Theorem we may calculate this probabillity to be Let us briefly explain the code. First, we defined two data types that store the values of the boxes and the marbles. Then, we modelled the outcomes using a list. We next defined a function pick that modelled the random selection of either box.
Where the monad comes in is the do block. In Haskell, do { x1 <-action1 ; x2 <-action2 ; mk_action3 x1 x2 } is short for action1 >>= (\ x1 -> action2 >>= (\ x2 -> mk_action3 x1 x2 ))
where »= is the bind combinator, i.e., Kleisli extension:
(mx »= f) : (TA, A → TB) → TB Since the program outputs three instances of BoxB and one of BoxA, we conclude that the probability that we had chosen Box A, given that we have extracted a white marble, is 1/4 as expected. It is worth noting that the algorithm is not really randomly selecting boxes and extracting marbles; we are merely simulating the non-determinism of the process by listing all the outcomes -that is the point, after all.
As a closing remark, we note that the powerset monad also models non-determinism effectively, albeit with less structure than the list monad -now we no longer keep track of duplicate entries, and elements of a list are returned having no order. Depending on the scenario it is useful to use one monad or the other. For instance, the powerset monad would not model our last example, since there we needed to keep track of duplicates. However, the powerset monad might better suit our first example if we wished to return values in no particular order and without repetitions.
